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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In two separate articles, Eric Maskin and Eric Posner attack the 
positive and normative bases of penalty defaults.1 Posner claims that 
there are no penalty defaults in contract law, and Maskin seems to 
claim that penalty defaults are not efficient. 
 This response refutes these claims. Posner can only come to his 
positive assessment by inappropriately carving away at what consti-
tutes a default, what constitutes my model, and what constitutes a 
penalty default. Maskin’s conclusion at most only limits the contexts 
where penalty defaults are efficient, and his counterexample to the 
Ayres and Gertner Hadley model is premised on an extremely fragile 
and unrealistic equilibrium concept. While Maskin proves that in-
formation-forcing rules are not always optimal, he fails to prove that 
there are not contexts (that is, parameter values) where information-
forcing is still efficient—including the contexts emphasized in Ayres 
and Gertner’s original model.2 
 Before Ayres and Gertner were published, there was a broad con-
sensus that lawmakers in setting defaults should simply strive to 
provide the substantive rule that the parties would have set for 
themselves—the so-called majoritarian default. A major goal of ours 
was to convince lawmakers that this one-tool toolbox was insuffi-
cient. We highlighted the possible efficiency of what we called “pen-
alty,” or information-forcing, defaults as a way to dramatize the need 
for lawmakers to consider a variety of nonmajoritarian bases for de-
fault setting. 
                                                                                                                      
 * William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. Rosemary Carey, Rob Gertner, 
and Eric Talley provided helpful comments. David Lenzi and Bharat Ramamurti provided 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. Eric Maskin, On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
557 (2006); Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006). 
 2. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
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 Reading the Maskin and Posner articles, one might get the idea 
that it would be fine for lawmakers to return to that simpler time 
when all they had to do was divine the rule that most contractors 
would want. This is clearly wrong. There is often a plausible horse-
race between radically different types of defaults, and savvy lawmak-
ers would do well to consider multiple bases for default setting—
including information-forcing effects. 
 I will take up the claims of these authors in turn. 
II.   RESPONDING TO POSNER’S CLAIM 
 A short answer to Eric might simply be: section 138.04 of the Wis-
consin Statutes.3 
 After all, since Posner’s claim is that there are no penalty de-
faults, it can be refuted simply by producing one counterexample. It 
just takes one purple frog to refute the claim that all frogs are green.  
 The Wisconsin statute ordains: 
 The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods or things in action shall be $5 upon the $100 for one year and 
according to that rate for a greater or less sum or for a longer or a 
shorter time; but parties may contract for the payment and receipt 
of a rate of interest not exceeding the rate allowed in ss. 138.041 to 
138.056, 138.09 to 138.12, 218.0101 to 218.0163, or 422.201, in 
which case such rate shall be clearly expressed in writing.4 
As parsed by courts, this statute simply means: “Where no other rate 
is clearly expressed in writing, the interest on obligations runs at the 
legal rate of five percent per year.”5 
 To my mind, this is a particularly striking example of a penalty de-
fault, because it is a default price for renting money that stands in 
stark contrast to the normal price default set out, for example, in sec-
tion 2-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).6 Instead of set-
ting a “reasonable price,” or setting out a formula for a default price 
that moves with the market—say prime plus two percent—the Wis-
consin Legislature in its wisdom chose a fairly low interest rate that 
operates as a penalty if lenders fail to adequately disclose the effective 
interest rate. In all likelihood, lawmakers intended the rule to have an 
information-forcing effect. Moreover, the efficiency of the default is 
plausibly defended on the basis of this information-forcing effect.  
 While this single counterexample is logically sufficient to refute 
the title of Posner’s article, my goal in this Part is to lay out a num-
                                                                                                                      
 3. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.04 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Act 105). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Diversified Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Slotten, 351 N.W.2d 176, 181 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). 
 6. U.C.C. § 2-305 (2005).  
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ber of plausible candidates. Posner is right that I need not prove that 
penalty defaults exist in order to argue that they should exist. But 
still, the descriptive question has normative relevance. Cautious 
lawmakers considering whether to enact a penalty default on norma-
tive grounds can be reassured by the descriptive prevalence of infor-
mation-forcing rules already in existence in other areas.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, most of the work in Posner’s analysis does 
not come from his restrictive reading of what constitutes a penalty 
(although his view is unduly restrictive). Most of the work is done by 
his restrictive definition of what constitutes a contractual default. 
Posner forthrightly excludes from analysis: 
 (1) any rules outside the “general rules of contract law”;7 
 (2) any rules concerning the formation of contracts; and  
 (3) any rules concerning the interpretation of contracts. 
To Posner, none of these rules are contractual defaults. While fine-
tuned distinctions as to what is or is not contractual, or as to what is 
or is not a default, might be appropriate in some contexts, they cer-
tainly are not appropriate if we want to get a handle on whether 
lawmakers should or should not consider deploying penalty defaults. 
 After thus narrowing the list of contractual defaults, Posner then 
adds a list of criteria for what constitutes a “penalty” consistent with 
my model—excluding from contention: 
(4) any rule which is justified by information-forcing effect for 
third parties (including courts); 
(5) at times, any rules that do not force contractors to reveal 
information about their valuation; and 
(6) at times, any rules that are not intended by the legislature 
to have an information-forcing effect.8 
These six exclusionary principles are unduly restrictive.  
 It is appropriate that I am writing these words for the Florida 
State University Law Review, because in my 1999 Ladd Lecture, Em-
pire or Residue, published in this very law review, I took up the 
analogous question of how we should define the appropriate domain 
of the term “contractual”: 
[W]e should not particularly care whether a field is characterized 
as contractual—unless something turns on the characterization. 
Our first response to someone’s impassioned suggestion that a par-
                                                                                                                      
 7. Posner, supra note 1, at 573 n.15. 
 8. It also seems that he flirts with the idea that only statutes can be defaults. All of 
his textual examples of defaults are taken from the U.C.C. Posner, supra note 1, at 566 
(citing a series of “random examples” of default rules in the U.C.C.). But at least implicitly 
he recognizes that common law judges create default damages. Id. at 567-69 (discussing 
the Hadley rule and default damages). 
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ticular area is or is not contractual should be “Who cares?” or per-
haps more precisely “Why should we care?” 
    . . . Essentialist debates about what is contract are not only se-
mantic in the most pejorative sense of the word, but may divert at-
tention from what is really at stake.9 
In that article, I cautiously adopted a default-centric definition of 
contracts: “[A]n area of law should be considered contractual if par-
ties can privately reorder a substantial portion of their legal rela-
tions.”10 I argued that such a definition was at least for some pur-
poses useful because it focused lawmakers and scholars on certain 
key transcendent questions—which rules should be displaceable by 
private action, what should be the content of displaceable rules, and 
what should be necessary and sufficient conditions for actually dis-
placing displacable rules. Nothing in particular turns on calling the 
laws default rules. Gertner and I might have just as easily referred 
to them as displaceable rules. 
 A central theme of my contract writing is that the choice of dis-
placeable rules is importantly different than the choice of nondis-
placeable rules. When private parties by mere formalisms can dis-
place the effect of a rule, the very act of formal displacement can 
have informational effects that nondisplaceable (that is, mandatory) 
rules cannot have. Lawmakers should consider these informational 
effects in choosing among potential defaults. In fact, a central claim 
of my first article with Rob Gertner is that lawmakers should some-
times choose one displaceable rule instead of another because of the 
informational impact of the act of displacing.  
 To my mind, this counsels for a broad definition of “defaults.” A 
broad definition of defaults lets lawmakers and analysts assess 
whether the choice of a given displaceable rule is best defended on 
the grounds of its informational impact. It also suggests that 
whether a legislature intended the rule to have an information-
forcing effect should not be of paramount importance. Milton Fried-
man long ago argued that it is often sufficient for economic actors to 
act “as if” they had a particular motive.11 It would be silly for Eric 
Posner to write a piece entitled “There Is No Such Thing as Marginal 
Cost Pricing,” based on the argument that firms intend to set the 
profit-maximizing price, not to set price equal to marginal cost. But 
the same is true of penalty defaults. Even without intending to 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 897, 898 (1999). 
 10. Id. at 899. 
 11. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 3 passim (1953).  
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choose an information-forcing rule, competitive processes may drive 
rulemakers to the right result.12  
 The simple idea that lawmakers—both legislators and common 
law courts—should consider the informational impact of default-
setting also counsels for a broad definition of what constitutes the 
Ayres-Gertner model. At times, Posner unfairly restricts our thesis to 
the Hadley v. Baxendale algebra; that is, to cases where the default 
pushes contracting parties to reveal information to each other about 
their valuations. In fact, our article expressly argued that penalty de-
faults could be justified because of their ability to produce a far wider 
variety of information—both about the parties themselves and about 
the law, and to both contractors and third parties (and especially 
courts). It is wrong headed for Posner to reject examples of penalty 
default rules that are justified at least in part by their information-
forcing effects for third parties or which induce the revelation of 
types of information other than valuation. But at various points in 
his article this is exactly what he does.13 
 Let me turn first to a functionalist rehabilitation of some specific 
defaults discussed in the original Ayres-Gertner article. Notwith-
standing Posner’s arguments to the contrary, these examples still 
provide compelling evidence that penalty defaults do exist. 
A.   Default Equivalents 
 I have to admit that I am a bit surprised that Posner would pro-
pound such a nonfunctionalist definition of what constitutes a de-
fault. If something quacks like a duck and walks like a duck, law-
and-economics folks tend to think it is a duck. Or put more formally, 
if the operation of a rule is functionally equivalent to a default, it is 
both acceptable and advisable to analyze it as a default. 
 A case in point is Posner’s analysis of the zero-quantity default. 
Posner claims “that the zero-quantity default is not a default rule at 
all; it is a legal formality.”14 But the operation of this formality is 
clearly equivalent to that of a default rule. This becomes especially 
clear if one compares it to the law’s treatment of missing price terms. 
Posner acknowledges that the “reasonable price” rule supplied by 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient 
Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 72-73 (1977). The absence of conscious attempts by lawmakers 
might be relevant for gauging whether lawmakers have sufficient information or motiva-
tion to craft an effective penalty default. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 572 (conceding that the void-for-indefiniteness 
rule prompts parties to write more definite contracts, but maintaining that it is neverthe-
less not a penalty default); id. at 584 (“Whatever one thinks of this reasoning, it reflects 
traditional consumer protection ideas and is not an application of the Ayres and Gertner 
model.”). 
 14. Id. at 576. 
594  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:589 
 
U.C.C. section 2-30515 is a default rule. Surely the U.C.C. might have 
created a “reasonable quantity” default in parallel fashion: “The par-
ties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the 
[quantity] is not settled. In such a case the [quantity] is a reasonable 
[quantity] at the time for delivery.” But the U.C.C. does not do any-
thing like this. Instead of filling such a contract with a reasonable 
quantity, U.C.C. courts are much more likely to require the parties to 
trade exactly zero. There are some potentially subtle substantive dif-
ferences between the operation of U.C.C. section 2-201 and a simple 
zero-quantity default.16 But the bottom line is that it is difficult to 
find cases where a U.C.C. court imposes a nonzero quantity when 
there is a pure missing quantity contract.  
 From a functionalist perspective then, U.C.C. section 2-201 oper-
ates in a fashion that is equivalent to a default, and it is a jarringly 
different kind of default setting from that of price. Quantity and 
price are the two central terms of any contract. They are the terms 
that every introductory microeconomics class puts on the vertical and 
horizontal axes in showing how supply equilibrates with demand. 
And in contrast to their deep economic symmetry, it remains surpris-
ing to see their disparate legal (yes, default) treatment.17 
 The notion of equivalence also rebuts Posner’s analysis of unilat-
eral mistake. Posner argues that the rule imbedded in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts section 153 “is not normally thought of as 
a default rule because it does not fill a gap in an otherwise valid con-
                                                                                                                      
 15. U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (2005). 
 16. For example under U.C.C. section 2-201, only contracts for goods “for the price of 
$500 or more” need to be in writing. Id. § 2-201. But if the contract only states a price of 
less than $500 per unit and no quantity, then it may not be clear whether any writing is 
needed. Failing to state a quantity in some circumstances may by itself take the contract 
out of the statute and might at least allow enforcement of a quantity up to some total price 
less than $500. But I have not been able to find any cases taking this approach. It is likely 
that a U.C.C. court would fail to enforce such an agreement. Under such circumstances, a 
court—possibly relying for support on U.C.C. section 2-204—is likely to find that there is 
not “a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.” Id. § 2-204.  
 It is interesting that an early draft of the revised U.C.C. proposed removing the zero-
quantity default. See U.C.C. § 2-201(a) (Proposed Revised Draft 1999), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc2299.htm (“A record is not insufficient merely 
because it omits a term including a quantity term.”). It seems that scholars, realizing that 
the section was a stark departure from majoritarian analysis, sought to shift to a more ma-
joritarian/“reasonable” gap-filling approach. But the final revision rejected the proposal 
and retained the zero-quantity default. 
 17. Posner also claims that “the logic of section 2-201 . . . does not follow their model.” 
Posner, supra note 1, at 577. But this is only true if one adopts an extremely cramped view 
of what constitutes the Ayres-Gertner model. Our article explicitly and repeatedly said 
that penalty defaults could be set so as to provide more information to third parties includ-
ing courts: “In contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at 
what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information 
to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2, at 
91 (emphasis added). The algebraic example of Hadley v. Baxendale was never put forward 
as the beginning and end of all possible penalty default applications. 
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tract . . . .”18 But again it is easy to restate the rule in a way that is 
equivalent to a default. To wit: Posner concedes that the implied 
warranties of merchantability and fitness—imbedded in U.C.C. sec-
tions 2-314 and 2-315 respectively—are defaults. But there is no rea-
son that the Restatement might not contain an implicit representa-
tion on the part of every promisor that they are not aware of any 
“mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that 
party is making the contract.”19 If default warranties are possible, 
why not default representations of fact? Indeed, not only is a default 
equivalent theoretically possible, it already exists. Restatement (Sec-
ond) section 161, aptly titled “When Non-Disclosure Is Equivalent to 
an Assertion,” already does precisely this.20  
 Posner might respond that a default representation would not 
give rise to the consequence of voidability that arises under section 
153. At times, he limits the term “default” to only those legal rules 
that fill gaps in contracts that are otherwise legally enforceable: “The 
mistake doctrine does not fill a gap in an incomplete contract; it op-
erates on precontractual behavior, preventing the formation of a con-
tract in the first place.”21  
 But all penalty defaults “operate on precontractual behavior” be-
cause it is the potential contractors’ aversion to the default penalty 
that causes them to change their contractual offers. And Posner is 
wrong to claim that the only impact of the mistake doctrine is to 
“prevent[] the formation of a contract in the first place.” Another po-
tential impact of the doctrine is to change the price at which the par-
ties contract. The seller in Laidlaw v. Organ might still have sold the 
buyer cotton, but he would have done so at a much higher price if 
unilateral mistake law had required correction of his mistaken basic 
assumption.22 Moreover, the impact of the law in preventing contract 
formation to my mind is an example of penalty default in action. The 
disclosure requirement tends to induce a more efficient separating 
equilibrium: potential contractors who do not have gains of trade do 
not contract, and those that do do. This is certainly preferable to a 
pooling equilibrium where both types of contractors contract. 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Posner, supra note 1, at 578. 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981). This same argument reveals 
the penalty default nature of Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 20(2), which re-
solves ambiguous expression of agreement against the contractor who was better placed to 
know of the ambiguity. Id. § 20(2). 
 20. Id. § 161. 
 21. Posner, supra note 1, at 578. 
 22. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 178, 179 (1817). Steve Shavell has 
acutely observed that notwithstanding the facial symmetry of the doctrine of unilateral 
mistake, the law is more willing to impose a default representation on sellers than on buy-
ers. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and 
the Incentive to Reveal Information, 15 STAN. L. REV. 1615, 1623-29 (1999). 
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 Finally, the default equivalence idea rebuts Posner’s argument 
that interpretive presumptions like contra proferentem are not at 
times usefully viewed as defaults. I do not want to go to the other ex-
treme and argue that default theory is useful in resolving all or even 
most interpretation issues. But there is a class of cases where the in-
terpretive ambiguity at issue is similar to an obligational gap in the 
contract. Or if you prefer, where the ambiguity represents a gap in 
the contract that the express contract only partially closed.23 Resolv-
ing the ambiguity through an act of interpretation is analogous to 
filling the obligational gap with a default. Where that act of interpre-
tation is carried out according to a predictable rule, parties will con-
tract around it just as they would a pure statutory default.  
 In this regard, it is striking that some interpretative rules of con-
struction take as their starting point not the intent of the drafting 
parties (which would resemble majoritarian gap-filling), but instead 
the interpretation which is least favorable to the drafter. Such rules 
are strong evidence that common law lawmakers have long under-
stood the value of information-forcing rules. The contra in contra pro-
ferentem rightly suggests a penalty; the interpretative presumption 
is not chosen because we think that the most negative interpretation 
is what the drafter or even the draftee normally wants, but rather 
because the rule of construction is a stick to force drafters to educate 
nondrafters. If doubting Thomases need a concrete default equiva-
lent, imagine a U.C.C. or Restatement section that read: “Unless oth-
erwise indicated, the parties to a contract intend that obligational 
gaps in their agreement be interpreted by the contra proferentem 
presumption.” There are reasonable responses to my interpretation 
as default argument. But at this point, the debate descends into the 
Nah-uh, Ya-huh dispute suggested by the title. 
B.   Plausibility of Penalties 
 In one sense, it is not even necessary to resolve this descriptive 
dispute about whether penalty defaults currently exist. Posner is 
right that the main purpose of our article was to establish the norma-
tive claim that penalty defaults in certain circumstances should be 
used. The article tried to establish a normative “possibility theorem.” 
Since we demonstrated that it is possible for penalty default at times to be 
efficient, lawmakers in choosing among different defaults should consider 
information-forcing rules—whether or not they have done so in the past. 
 But the existence—and indeed prevalence—of penalty defaults are 
not completely irrelevant to our normative claim. One does not have to 
                                                                                                                      
 23. For example, in a contract to build a swimming pool, the failure to specify the be-
ginning or ending date or the failure to specify whether a filter will be installed can be 
viewed as giving rise to a question of interpretation or a question of gap-filling. 
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be a hardcore believer in survival efficiency24 to believe that the exis-
tence of several penalty defaults in the law lends some credence to the 
idea that penalty defaults are feasible to construct and implement. 
 But Posner bizarrely stacks the deck against plausibility by argu-
ing that the Ayres and Gertner theory proves too much. Posner 
claims that if our theory were right, “one would expect all general de-
fault rules to be penalty default rules.”25 This is absurd. The transac-
tion costs savings of majoritarian default rules are sufficient to in-
sure against any such pathological corner solution. 
 Posner is on much stronger ground when he, like others, argues 
that lawmakers lack the requisite information to competently choose 
defaults.26 I am sympathetic to this argument. In fact, Rob Gertner 
and I emphasized in our second default article that the optimal rule 
may turn on subtle underlying parameters that may, as a practical 
matter, fall beyond lawmakers’ ken.27 
 Nonetheless, I believe that there are certain types of information-
forcing in which lawmakers can competently engage. In particular, I 
think that it is easier for lawmakers to enact information-forcing de-
faults with regard to the disclosure of legal obligations and rights, 
rather than the underlying characteristics of the contracting parties 
themselves. Contractors are complex creatures who come in many 
different sizes and make decisions on multiple dimensions. Forcing 
them to reveal their hands can be a tricky business. But lawmakers 
might more easily ensure that uninformed promisors know what 
they are contracting for and understand the law—and penalty de-
faults are a feasible way of inducing the contractor who has better in-
formation to educate the less informed, if not about themselves, then 
at least about the law and the precise terms of the contract.  
 The “legal information-forcing” rules are most plausible when 
there is asymmetric information about the content of the law itself. 
In the face of asymmetric legal information, a straightforward solu-
tion is to set the default against the more knowledgeable party. In 
many contexts, for example, one contractor is a repeat player and the 
other is not. The repeat player—think retail business or insurance 
company—is more likely to learn the content of the legal rule than 
the one-off consumer. The natural response is to establish a default 
                                                                                                                      
 24. This idea, which was embraced by George Stigler, among others, holds that the 
survival of a legal rule is prima facie evidence of its efficiency. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE 
ECONOMIST AS PREACHER AND OTHER ESSAYS (1982); George J. Stigler, Law or Economics?, 
35 J.L. & ECON. 455, 459 (1992); see also Priest, supra note 12. 
 25. Posner, supra note 1, at 570. 
 26. Id. at 587-88; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618-19 (2003).  
 27. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1609 (1999). 
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that disfavors the repeat player. This, of course, is what the contra 
proferentem rule in insurance is all about—but, as we will soon see, it 
happens in other contexts as well. 
 While penalty defaults focused on the content of legal obligations 
are particularly prevalent, there are also times when defaults can fea-
sibly induce disclosure of contractor characteristics. Many times these 
penalty defaults will be formation defaults that block a legal status 
unless particularized information about specific dimensions is ade-
quately disclosed. Just as the default quantity is zero unless an alter-
native quantity is affirmatively disclosed, the default patent rule is no-
enforcement unless the claims are adequately disclosed. The default 
business organization rule is that liability is not limited unless certain 
information (address, number of shares, number of directors) is ade-
quately disclosed. The default rule is that sale of certain classes of 
stock is prohibited unless certain information is adequately set out in 
a prospectus. In Connecticut, the Home Improvement Act gives home-
owners an option to void any improvement contract that fails to state 
both the beginning and ending dates of construction.28 
 A blanket statement against the institutional incompetence of 
lawmakers to establish information-forcing rules with regard to con-
tractor type pushes toward the conclusion that lawmakers could never 
competently mandate disclosure. While there is often a debate about 
whether disclosure laws are effective or advisable,29 these examples 
make plain that lawmakers think that mandating disclosure is at least 
feasible as a prerequisite of achieving certain legal statuses. 
 In the search for penalty or information-forcing defaults, there are 
two more empirical guideposts that can help us on our way. First, 
look for defaults where the majority of contractors contract around to 
a particular alternative, but lawmakers over the years do not re-
                                                                                                                      
 28. The Connecticut Statute provides:  
No home improvement contract shall be valid or enforceable against an owner 
unless it: (1) Is in writing, (2) is signed by the owner and the contractor, (3) 
contains the entire agreement between the owner and the contractor, (4) con-
tains the date of the transaction, (5) contains the name and address of the con-
tractor, (6) contains a notice of the owner’s cancellation rights in accordance 
with the provisions of chapter 740, (7) contains a starting date and completion 
date, and (8) is entered into by a registered salesman or registered contractor. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-429(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 Supp. to General Stat.); 
see also Rizzo Pool Co. v. Del Grosso, 657 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. 1995) (citations omitted) 
(“Because the requirements of the HIA are mandatory and must be strictly construed, the 
absence of these dates constitutes a violation of the HIA that renders the contract unen-
forceable. Thus, the plaintiff is precluded from recovery against the defendants unless the 
plaintiff can establish that the defendants’ invocation of the HIA as the basis for their re-
pudiation of the contract was in bad faith.”). 
 29. For a good summary of this long-standing and ongoing debate, see Devin F. Ryan, 
Comment, Yet Another Bough on the “Judicial Oak”: The Second Circuit Clarifies Inquiry 
Notice and Its Loss Causation Requirement Under the PSLRA in Lentell v. Merrill Lynch 
& Co., 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 485, 494 n.61 (2005).   
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spond by switching the default to the alternative preferred by the 
majority. Second, look for contexts where the law regulates the in-
formational content of attempts to contract around defaults. Cases in 
which courts refuse to give effect to attempted opt-outs because the 
attempts did not adequately disclose either the alternative obligation 
or information about the underlying contractor’s type are strong evi-
dence that an information-forcing impetus is at play. In the examples 
that follow, pay attention to how often the penalty default rules iden-
tified by others are consistent with these two guideposts. 
C.   Other Examples of Existing Penalty Defaults 
 The bulk of Posner’s analysis is a rehashing of the handful of ex-
amples that Gertner and I discussed in our original model. This is 
not a very satisfying methodology to support the broad claim that 
there are no penalty defaults. And Posner commendably does go fur-
ther and asks whether any judges in reported decisions think that 
they are using penalty defaults. On the face of it the answer is yes. 
There are a number of opinions where judges think that the result is 
equivalent to a penalty default.30 Posner is reduced to arguing that 
these judges do not know what they are saying. Posner insists that 
his own limited definition of what constitutes a penalty default is ap-
propriate and that these cases are not consistent with his definition.  
 What Posner does not tell you is that all three of the opinions that 
he discusses in his text are written by law-and-economics judges. 
(Yes, it helps our citation rates to have friends in high places.) Judge 
Easterbrook in Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Insurance Co. under-
stood that the contra proferentem idea is equivalent to a penalty de-
fault (but chose not to apply it).31 In contrast, Judge Calabresi, in 
both American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Kenealy and City of 
Burlington v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, adopted de-
fault interpretations of insurance contracts that were aimed at deter-
ring insurers from strategically withholding information.32 
                                                                                                                      
 30. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 332 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 
2003); Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Kenealy, 72 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 31. 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Perhaps the interpretive principle could be re-
cast as one requiring the insurer to come forth with information in its possession but un-
known to the insured.” (citing Ayres & Gertner, supra note 2)). 
 32. Calabresi justified his result in part by arguing: 
A default rule placing the burden on the insurance company and requiring it to 
contract out of its duty, explicitly and unequivocally, is one way to achieve the 
desired clarity. 
    . . . It, in effect, prohibits insurers from taking the benefits of agency repre-
sentation while still strategically withholding information as to what authority 
the agent actually has . . . . 
Kenealy, 72 F.3d at 268-69. 
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 Posner’s response to the Kenealy opinion is particularly illustra-
tive of Posner’s cramped conception of what constitutes an example 
of information-forcing. How does Posner respond to Judge Calabresi’s 
embrace of penalty default reasoning? Posner says, “Although the 
court cited Ayres and Gertner’s article, the court did not have any 
concerns about the insurer having private information about its 
valuation. . . . Whatever one thinks of this reasoning, it reflects tradi-
tional consumer protection ideas and is not an application of the 
Ayres and Gertner model.”33 Here, Posner says, Calabresi’s inten-
tional use of a default to reduce asymmetric information about con-
tractual obligation does not count. At this point in his argument, 
Posner has restricted the acceptable class of examples not just to 
penalty defaults concerning underlying contractor characteristics, 
but only characteristics related to the contractors’ valuations.34 While 
it is true that our algebraic Hadley model concerned asymmetric in-
formation about a buyer’s valuation, this Hadley model is not the al-
pha and omega of the Ayres and Gertner theory. The broader theory 
expressly stated in the article is that penalty defaults could poten-
tially produce useful information about a variety of issues to people 
both inside and outside of the bargain.  
 But Posner’s argument is not just with me and Gertner and 
Calabresi and Easterbrook. Posner might have easily looked at the 
hundreds of law review articles that have explicitly grappled with 
the idea of penalty or information-forcing defaults.35 (An empirical 
search limited to lawmakers who explicitly use the phrase “penalty 
default” is of course unreasonably narrow. After all, not everyone will 
be familiar with the label, even as they might embrace its theoretical 
thrust. Scholars are much more likely to know of the neologistic 
phrase—indeed that is why it should not be surprising that Calabresi 
and Easterbrook have led the way in its judicial usage.) Even a cur-
sory review of that existing legal scholarship uncovers dozens of 
scholars who claim that existing laws represent penalty defaults. 
Here is a lengthy list of assertions in the scholars’ own words that 
penalty or information-forcing defaults currently exist: 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Posner, supra note 1, at 584 (citation omitted).  
 34. This is also the gist of Posner’s attempt to avoid the power of Burlington: “Al-
though the court cited the Ayres and Gertner article, like the Kenealy court, it relied on a 
different theory—namely, that insureds do not understand their coverage, and that default 
rules should reflect the expectations of the insureds rather than the jointly optimal terms.” 
Id. at 585. Only by limiting the claims of the Ayres-Gertner theory to the specifics of the 
Ayres-Gertner algebraic model can Posner conclude that such an information-forcing de-
fault is not a valid counter-example to his thesis.  
 35. A Westlaw search in the “journals and law reviews” database uncovered more 
than 800 publications that used either “penalty default” or “ ‘information forcing’/2 (rule 
default)” or “((ayres ayers) /5 gertner).” 
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[P]rosecution history estoppel is best viewed as an information-
forcing default penalty rule, where the possibility of lost patent 
scope induces patentees to produce socially valuable information 
early in the life of the patent.  
. . . .  
 [T]he penalty default rule operates here to encourage crisp and 
considered drafting of both original and amended claims . . . .36 
 One of the boldest efforts to reconfigure conventional environ-
mental regulation into a penalty default regime was the Depart-
ment of the Interior’s aggressive expansion of [the Habitat Conser-
vation Plan provision of the Endangered Species Act] . . . .37 
[I]nequitable conduct [claims in patent law] also function[] as a 
penalty default to discourage applicants from playing strategic 
games.38 
On the other hand, the economic theory of an information-eliciting 
penalty default accounts for the rule [of Hadley] quite nicely.39 
[P]enalty default contract rules, like for example the doctrine of 
foreseeability, may induce a party with a high subjective value on 
performance to divulge this and, consequently, limit his potential 
to behave opportunistically.40 
In its current form, the Statute [of Frauds] essentially establishes 
a conclusive presumption that transactors do not want legal en-
forcement of a given agreement unless they produce a writing. In 
effect, the Statute operates as a penalty default rule that forces 
parties desiring legal enforcement to contract around the rule by 
producing a writing that makes clear their intent to form a legal 
obligation.41 
[C]ourts often employ penalty default rules, such as the rule that 
courts construe ambiguities against the drafter of a contract.42 
[S]ome courts interpret the “definiteness” requirement as a pen-
alty default, designed to force the parties to fill the gaps them-
selves if they want their contract to be enforceable.43 
                                                                                                                      
 36. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of 
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 159, 218-19 (2002) (emphasis omitted). 
 37. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty 
Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970 (2003). 
 38. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Com-
bating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 157, 159-60 (2005). 
 39. Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1504 (2005). 
 40. Eleni Zervogianni, Remedies for Damage to Property: Money Damages or Restitu-
tion in Natura?, 24 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 525, 527 (2004). 
 41. Shawn Pompian, Note, Is the Statute of Frauds Ready for Electronic Contracting?, 
85 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1453 (1999). 
 42. David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking 
Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 71-72 (2005). 
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[S]ome of the employee handbook decisions [in which courts have 
construed employee handbooks as binding contracts], rather than 
using classical contractual analysis, create a penalty default rule 
that forces employers to inform their employees of certain critical 
information regarding the employment relationship.44 
[I]t could be argued that conflicts rules are sometimes penalty de-
fault rules. In transactional settings, for example, rules that pro-
hibit lawyers from concurrently representing clients with adverse 
interests, even in unrelated matters, are penalty default rules.45 
 Section 10 [of the Endangered Species Act] enforcement has 
transformed section 9’s nominally invariant rule into a “penalty 
default” rule, a legal baseline intentionally designed to be suffi-
ciently unpleasant to spur affected parties into negotiating more 
favorable alternatives.46 
Instead, we predict that [for law firms] the only function of the 
[general partnership] form [as opposed to the LLC form] in the 
coming years will be as a penalty default rule that forces parties 
contemplating the formation of a business or professional enter-
prise to reveal relevant information to courts and interested third 
parties.47 
 Default licenses [in copyright] can be analogized to the “penalty 
defaults” of the type proposed by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner as 
gap-filling rules for incomplete contracts.48 
[T]he dormant Commerce Clause operates as a penalty default 
rule, reflecting Congress’s usual preference but on occasion impos-
ing a penalty default that forces Congress to reveal its real prefer-
ences when recommitment to local control would arguably serve 
national interests.49 
Chevron deference and Pennhurst’s clear-statement rule might 
therefore be viewed as federalism-based versions of “penalty de-
fault rules.”50 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 
540 (1996). 
 44. Rachel Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: 
The Creation of a Common Law Information-Eliciting Penalty Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 695, 697 (2005). 
 45. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 
293 (2000) (citation omitted).  
 46. Jim Chen, Legal Mythmaking in a Time of Mass Extinctions: Reconciling Stories 
of Origins with Human Destiny, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 279, 301 (2005). 
 47. Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Economics of Limited Liability: An Em-
pirical Study of New York Law Firms, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 107, 149. 
 48. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 556 (2004). 
 49. Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1792 (2004). 
 50. David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (2004). 
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 Second, given the potential informational asymmetries between 
repeat-player trust lawyers and institutional fiduciaries on the one 
hand, and settlors on the other, there is room as a normative mat-
ter for the occasional information-forcing default rule. As a positive 
matter, such penalty defaults do exist. Perhaps the most salient 
example concerns clauses that exonerate the trustee from liability 
to the beneficiaries for breach of trust.51 
Sometimes decrees in public law cases take an in terrorem or puni-
tive form—threatening or, far less often, imposing sanctions in or-
der to induce compliance with other orders. These background 
sanctions function as a kind of “penalty default”—a result that no 
one is likely to prefer, intended to induce the parties to negotiate a 
better one.52 
Rather than serving as the vehicle for fully informed agency deci-
sion-making, the [Environmental Impact Statement] operates as a 
penalty-default rule, creating an incentive for agencies to avoid its 
onerous requirements by upgrading environmental standards at 
an earlier stage of project design.53 
[L]egal ethics rules barring conflicts of interest absent consent by 
both parties can be considered penalty default rules.54 
 The court [in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.] established that Ty-
son knew about the events that it later claimed gave rise to a [ma-
terial adverse effect and would thereby trigger a MAC clause in 
the contract]. Thus, by failing to contract around them, Tyson im-
plicitly bore the risks associated with those events. This “penalty 
default rule” produces efficient results because it forces the buyer 
either to take precaution or reveal the risk to the other party and 
pay him to assume it.55 
The court’s “penalty” default rule induces an employer who would 
find assignment valuable to negotiate for an express assignment 
provision in exchange for the proper compensation. This rule will 
at least bring the issue to the employee’s attention, somewhat re-
ducing the information asymmetry and enhancing the contract’s 
total value.56 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 
644-45 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 52. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1067 (2004) (citation omitted). 
 53. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 349 (2004). 
 54. Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for Cus-
tomizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 236 (2003). 
 55. Jonathon M. Grech, Comment, “Opting Out”: Defining the Material Adverse 
Change Clause in a Volatile Economy, 52 EMORY L.J. 1483, 1513 (2003) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 56. Comment, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds That Covenants Not to Compete 
Are Not Assignable by Default and Are Not Enforceable to Protect Financial Interests Alone, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 2238, 2245 (2003). 
604  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:589 
 
[T]he WIPO Copyright Treaty’s protections for traditional sover-
eignty interact to create a potential nonenforcement default for the 
Treaty’s protections of digitally transmitted material in signatory 
states where protections are most needed. The result is a penalty 
default for copyright-profiting states.57 
Boucicault v. Fox seems to have imposed a penalty default, as the 
court explained that it expected employers to contract expressly for 
copyright ownership when they deemed it possible and desirable.58 
[T]he European Union set a sort of “penalty default” of interopera-
bility in its 1991 Software Directive. That directive provides that if 
a copyright owner in a computer program does not make interface 
information “readily available,” others are permitted to reverse 
engineer the program to obtain that information.59 
The Directive [on European Works Councils] operates, then, 
through a “penalty default” rule, in other words, a fallback provi-
sion that induces a more powerfully-placed or better-informed 
party (here, the employer) to enter into a bargaining process when 
it otherwise would lack an incentive to do so.60 
[The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000] permits arbitrators 
to order such remedies as the arbitrator considers just and appro-
priate under the circumstances and specifies that a court may not 
vacate or refuse to confirm an award because a remedy granted by 
an arbitrator could not or would not be granted by the court in a 
civil action. This provision makes possible extra-legal arbitral 
powers. Although a default provision, it seems more a “penalty” de-
fault than “majoritarian;” one intended to compel the parties to 
clarify the arbitrator’s remedial authority.61 
While determining plain language in an electronic contract may 
create interpretive difficulty for a trial court, the current allocation 
[of risk of loss under U.C.C. Section 2-509] operates as a “penalty 
default” rule favoring sellers.62 
[I]t is possible to understand the general partnership as a “penalty 
default.” That is, many, if not most, organizers of business firms 
may prefer characteristics that cannot be achieved through a gen-
                                                                                                                      
 57. Mary De Ming Fan, Governing Copyright in Cyberspace: The Penalty Default 
Problem with State-Centric Sovereignty, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 315, 317 (2003). 
 58. Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 54-55 (2003). 
 59. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organiza-
tions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1962 n.305 (2002). 
 60. Catherine Barnard & Simon Deakin, ‘Negative’ and ‘Positive’ Harmonization of 
Labor Law in the European Union, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 389, 410-11 (2002). 
 61. Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in 
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 215 (2002) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). 
 62. Seth Gardenswartz, The Risk of Loss in Electronic Transactions: Vintage Law for 
21st Century Consumers, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 15, 56 (2001) (citations omitted), available at 
http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue3/v6i3-a15-Gardenswartz.html. 
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eral partnership; the structure of general partnership law creates 
incentives to choose other organizational forms.63 
For example, Model Rule 1.7, which prohibits lawyers from con-
currently representing clients with adverse interests, even in unre-
lated matters, is arguably a penalty default rule for transactional 
lawyers who routinely seek, and are routinely granted, permission 
to represent another client on the opposite side of a deal from a cli-
ent whom they represent in other matters.64 
The rule of strict liability seeks to correct for the unequal informa-
tion between the bailor and bailee about the risk of transfer to a 
third party. Strict liability here serves to protect the bailor much 
in the way a penalty default rule protects the informationally dis-
advantaged party in the law of contracts.65 
 Limited liability functions as a bargain-forcing rule in this con-
text. If the creditor does not protect itself by extracting a personal 
guarantee from the shareholder, it is penalized by having its re-
covery limited to the corporation’s assets. To be sure, the penalty is 
one-sided. One-sided penalty defaults, however, are appropriate 
where the parties to the contract have asymmetrical information 
because they force the better-informed party to disclose informa-
tion.66 
Allocating the risk of loss to the employee [who knowingly fails to 
disclose past wrongdoing when he is hired] has an added benefit—
it encourages the disclosure of information. It does this by acting 
as a penalty default term to employees. Penalty default terms en-
courage the disclosure of information by providing a strong incen-
tive to at least one of the parties to negotiate around the default 
term.67 
The Court sometimes uses what is called a rule of clear statement, 
which holds that if Congress intended a certain result, it should 
have said so more clearly in the statute. This rule is said to be 
similar to the penalty default in Contract Law. A penalty default is 
a judicial construction of a contract that is unfavorable to the 
drafter in order to create an incentive for the drafter, and other 
similarly situated drafters, to make more clear the legal relation-
ship that the contract actually creates.68 
                                                                                                                      
 63. Deborah A. DeMott, Transatlantic Perspectives on Partnership Law: Risk and In-
stability, 26 J. CORP. L. 879, 892 (2001) (citation omitted). 
 64. Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 686 (2001) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 65. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 816 (2001). 
 66. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 502-03 (2001) 
(citation omitted). 
 67. Strider L. Dickson, Recent Decisions, 60 MD. L. REV. 886, 906-07 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
 68. Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme 
Court’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 149, 158 (2001) (citation omitted). 
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 The [rule permitting] consultants to retain ownership of inven-
tions . . . serves as a penalty default. The notion here is that since 
employers are in a better position to know whether a consultant’s 
planned R&D is likely to produce inventions highly complemen-
tary to the firm’s pre-existing assets, the burden ought to be on the 
employer to disclose this information to the consultant ex ante.69 
The foundational rule [of the Fourth Amendment’s protection] is a 
property rule because rightsholders are permitted to consent to 
government searches, that is, to waive their right. This property 
rule is enforced via the mechanism of the exclusionary rule, which 
can be viewed as a penalty-default rule imposed on the govern-
ment for engaging in unconsented searches.70 
The cost to transactors of specifying time frames for important as-
pects of contractual performance in the boilerplate on their confir-
mations is quite low and might, in fact, be the type of practice we 
want to encourage through a “penalty default” type of incentive.71 
 The presumption that local governments can serve federal inter-
ests serves a third purpose: it acts as a “penalty default,” giving 
state legislatures an incentive to resolve political disputes about 
the costs of local action.72 
Being parsimonious [as a judge when gap-filling in contract law] 
will sometimes mean refusing to give any legal effect to the 
agreement because of its failure of specificity. This can be justified 
as a “penalty default” which gives subsequent contracting parties 
an incentive to be specific and complete.73 
A presumption of contractual intent is a default rule for deciding 
which issues fall within the scope of an otherwise unspecific arbi-
tration clause. Whether understood as a majoritarian or penalty 
default, it is selected to effectuate or elicit the preferences of con-
tracting parties.74 
Often, so-called [environmental regulation] standards may serve 
as threat points in negotiation or as penalty defaults that force in-
formation disclosure.75 
                                                                                                                      
 69. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 36-37 (1999) (citation omitted). 
 70. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting, Purchasing, 
and Possibly Condemning Tobacco Advertising, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1143, 1164 (1999) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 71. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 777-78 (1999). 
 72. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free State 
and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1279 (1999). 
 73. Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 
303, 335 (1999) (citation omitted). 
 74. Steven Walt, Decision by Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial 
Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 369, 401 (1999). 
 75. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Com-
pliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 315 (1999). 
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 In short, trust law establishes here a “penalty default”—that is, 
a default rule of liability for the Manager that is generally ineffi-
cient, but that gives the Manager an incentive to reverse the rule 
by revealing clearly to third parties that she is, in fact, just a 
Manager and that the third parties may turn only to designated 
Managed Property for their security.76 
This “market contrarian” approach, as we shall call it, requires 
lawmakers to assign the entitlement to the party who values it 
less, thus forcing the higher-valuing party to share the cooperative 
surplus—which can be created only through a trade—with the 
lower-valuing party. . . . This approach seems to us to be a prop-
erty-law equivalent of the argument in favor of penalty default 
rules in contract law.77 
There are several aspects of debt financing that suggest the rele-
vance of a penalty default analysis.78 
The Supreme Court [in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 
Inc.] chose to apply a penalty default rule against the drafter of the 
contract, thereby removing any advantage the drafter may have 
had as the more knowledgeable party.79 
[Ayres and Gertner’s] logic may apply to justify the use of a pen-
alty default in choice of law cases—it is more expensive for a court 
to attempt to fill gaps concerning proper law than it is for parties 
to contract affirmatively for the law they want.80 
If purchasers expect copyright to apply to the data they purchase 
and fail to notice the use restriction, they may pay too much for 
the product. A penalty default of nonenforcement would correct 
this market imperfection of asymmetric information by encourag-
ing sellers to disclose information. The use restriction would gen-
erally be enforceable if the seller brought it to the purchaser’s at-
tention.81 
                                                                                                                      
 76. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Le-
gal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 461 (1998) (citation omitted). 
 77. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be 
Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 339 & n.34 (1998). 
 78. Frederick W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Contract: The 
Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077, 1130 (1998). 
 79. Stuart I. Silverman, Punitive Damages Awards in Commercial Arbitrations: The 
Role of Federal Substantive Law in Deriving Contractual Intent, 102 COM. L.J. 306, 321 
n.81 (1997). 
 80. Michael Whincop & Mary Keyes, Putting the ‘Private’ Back into Private Interna-
tional Law: Default Rules and the Proper Law of the Contract, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 515, 
531 (1997). 
 81. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 85 (1997). 
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[A] presumption of enforceability [under Section 90] is an efficient 
default rule because it is an “information-forcing” default rule of the 
sort that was later identified by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner.82 
The Alaska statute provides default rules that should ensure 
treatment as a partnership for federal tax purposes, but a convert-
ing business organization may want to contract around certain of 
the default provisions of the Alaska statute that seem to be pen-
alty default rules. For example, Alaska Statute section 10.50.290 
provides for per capita distribution of profits and losses. In in-
stances where members have widely different interests in an LLC, 
this rule may be unpalatable for minority owners who would not 
want per capita distribution of losses and majority owners who 
would not want per capita distribution of gains.83 
 Minimalist double jeopardy doctrine [under Blockburger] creates 
a similar sort of information-forcing penalty default for the defen-
dant aware of uncharged criminal liability and dissatisfied with 
the standard formal and informal guarantees. To obtain maximum 
formal protection, he will have to identify himself as a high-value 
defendant to all potentially concerned prosecutors.84 
For some offers, the actual risk of revocation is lower than the 
market average and the extra delay is unnecessary; for others, the 
risk is higher than average and the delay is insufficient. The prob-
lem is asymmetric information, and the proper response may be an 
information-forcing rule—what Ayres and Gertner have labeled a 
“penalty default.” By holding liable the party with superior infor-
mation, the law can provide an incentive for disclosure. Other 
things being equal, this is an efficient rule because it encourages 
reliance decisions to be made on the best information possible.85 
The warning requirement [to web users that a given ISP will dis-
close their activities] is information forcing in that the more so-
phisticated party—here, the system operator—must tell the less 
sophisticated party—here, the user—about the background legal 
rule in order for that rule to go into effect.86 
If the broad waiver of fiduciary duties is part of the original 
agreement creating the trust, the court may avoid the trust as in-
choate, because the agreement is not sufficiently instructive to the 
fiduciary. The trust will be dissolved, and the assets will revert to 
                                                                                                                      
 82. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 990 (citation omitted). 
 83. Katherine Quigley, Note, Converting to a Limited Liability Company: Considerations 
for Alaska Business Organizations, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 289, 292 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 84. Daniel C. Richman, Bargaining About Future Jeopardy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1181, 
1204 (1996) (citation omitted). 
 85. Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel 
in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1290 (1996). 
 86. Keith Sharfman, Regulating Cyberactivity Disclosures: A Contractarian Approach,  
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 639, 649. 
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the estate of the trustor. . . . Facially, this example can be ex-
plained by the theory of penalty default rules in which the courts 
penalize parties for failing to specify terms of their agreements 
when the costs of such specification are far below the costs to the 
courts of determining the terms ex post facto.87 
 Much as warranty contracts can convey information to consum-
ers, [original equipment makers, or] OEMs can reveal information 
about aftermarket costs to consumers via aftermarket supply con-
tracts. Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have argued that 
contract default rules should be chosen so as to “penalize” the more 
informed party, thus inducing that party to reveal its information 
in contract bargaining and formation. This theory, as applied to 
the problem of aftermarket costs, resembles a penalty default for 
OEMs: firms can avoid the penalty by revealing the types of infor-
mation that concerned the Kodak Court, such as life-cycle price in-
formation, in aftermarket supply contracts. An exemption from an-
titrust liability under Kodak for OEMs that offer aftermarket sup-
ply contracts creates incentives for disclosure of information that 
helps both consumers and courts.88 
 In a sense, [the] Van Gorkom [requirement of a paper trail] im-
poses a penalty default rule: managers must memorialize their ac-
tions, especially in such extraordinary transactions as takeovers, 
or they will lose the protection of the business judgment rule. The 
economic rationale behind such a rule is that it will be cheaper for 
managers to memorialize their actions than to try to reconstruct 
their actions during a later trial.89 
 Penalty default rules purposely impose a result that the con-
tracting parties would not want in order to give at least one party 
an incentive to contract around the default rule and select the con-
tract provision they prefer. If, for example, parties contracting for 
goods do not specify quantity, the Uniform Commercial Code man-
dates a penalty default by refusing to enforce the contract. In a 
voluntary whistleblowing regime, lawyers could avoid the penalty 
default (Rule D, for example) by choosing and advertising another 
whistleblowing rule.90 
 Alternatively, in the situation where the bank is weak and the 
borrower strong, [the] D’Oench [doctrine, which estops borrowers 
from asserting secret side agreements when the FDIC seeks to col-
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lect on notes acquired from a failed bank] serves as a penalty de-
fault rule which induces the borrower to reveal to the bank what 
underlying terms and conditions are material. This helps to pro-
tect the bank from later litigation by a powerful borrower who 
acted strategically during the original loan negotiation.91 
Adopting a conventionalist default rule that reflects the common-
sense expectation of the community of discourse of which the ra-
tionally ignorant party is a member would reduce the instances of 
this sort of subjective disagreement. Such a rule functions as a 
penalty default, creating an incentive for the rationally informed 
party to express a preference for the term that deviates from this 
common sense. In this way, the rationally informed party is in-
duced to inform by its bargaining behavior the rationally ignorant 
party of the terms of their agreement and reduce the incidence of 
subjective disagreement.92 
The traditional [reasonable certainty] rule [for calculating lost 
profits in awarding damages for breach of contract], by purpose-
fully denying compensation for a new business’ lost profits, acts as 
such a penalty default.93 
By pretending to have a penalty default rule of denying probate to 
unattested wills, we encourage people to use witnesses. A penalty 
default is one that is contrary to what the person would intend, 
but may nonetheless foster efficient behavior.94 
“Penalty default rules” are strategically designed to encourage at 
least one of the parties expressly to contract around the default 
rule, thereby revealing information to the other party or to third 
parties. In the present context, a rule providing that the promisor 
is not responsible for the object’s conformity to special purpose 
unless she is informed thereof will encourage the promisee to pro-
vide her with this information. In fact, under most legal systems 
the risk of nonconformity to special purposes is borne by the pro-
misee unless she has notified the promisor of her needs.95 
 But even if manufacturers had some information that their in-
surers did not, it is not clear that that would have led to adverse 
selection. Low-risk insureds would have a strong incentive to dis-
close that information to insureds to prove that they were in fact 
low-risk insureds. Their alternative would be to withhold informa-
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tion and pay the pool rate. Hence, insurance pricing may act as a 
“penalty default,” through which information is passed to insurers, 
because good risks disclose while bad risks do not, and insurers 
can thereby measure or infer each insured’s relative riskiness.96 
 It has been argued that refusing to enforce corporate charters 
that have not complied with formalities forces incorporators to dis-
close such facts as the number of authorized shares, the registered 
address of the corporation, and the state of incorporation. In effect, 
personal liability in this situation is a “penalty” default intended to 
force disclosure by the more informed party.97 
Under my approach, the normal default rules of fiduciary duty 
would generally govern unless the parties have clearly opted out by 
a valid charter provision that is sufficiently transaction specific 
that investors can appraise its impact. This approach is deliber-
ately coercive in that it compels those possessing discretion or pri-
vate information to contract around the default rule and in so do-
ing to reveal their actual intentions.98 
Phew! That’s a lot of purple frogs. In keeping with the playground 
spirit of the title, Eric, why don’t you and they fight?  
 And while you’re at it, consider your father’s decision in Market 
Street Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey.99 In that case, plaintiffs 
had leased property from General Electric (GE) and later sought spe-
cific performance of a provision in the lease—paragraph 34—
whereby they were entitled to purchase the property in the event 
that GE refused to consider financing for improvements.100 The facts 
make clear that GE’s representatives did not recall this provision 
when they refused to consider financing, that plaintiffs did not re-
fresh GE’s memory and that the result was a buy-back option at a be-
low-market price that caught GE by surprise.101 The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff/lessee,102 presumably 
reasoning that GE was bound by the terms of the contract it signed, 
the absence of a reminder notwithstanding. But Judge Posner re-
versed and remanded.103 The gravamen of his decision was the possi-
bility that the plaintiffs had “tried to trick [GE by not reminding 
them of the provision, and thus engaged in] . . . the type of opportun-
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istic behavior in an ongoing contractual relationship that would vio-
late the duty of good faith.”104 While Judge Posner remanded the 
question to the district court, he acknowledged that, at a minimum, 
the doctrine of good faith must be read into the contract and fur-
nished a default out of which a party would need to contract.105 If, in 
not reminding GE of paragraph 34, plaintiffs had violated that duty, 
the buy-back would not be enforced. What is extraordinary about this 
decision is that even between two sophisticated parties, Judge Pos-
ner seems to impose a default obligation of disclosure. Of course, I 
would expect Eric Posner to argue that this opinion has nothing to do 
with the choice of a default. But it is equivalent to a default if you be-
lieve (as I do) that the result would have been different if the original 
contract had explicitly said that the lessee has no duty to disclose the 
buy-back option or its formula. The decision is thus equivalent to a 
default promise to disclose information about the buy-back option 
unless otherwise indicated in the original contract.  
D.   What About Hadley? 
 To this point, I have not taken up the question of whether the cen-
tral example of Hadley in fact constitutes a penalty default. Posner 
himself is not sure—claiming only that this “rule is probably not a 
penalty default rule.”106 In one sense Hadley can be seen as a majori-
tarian rule. In our example, the majority of contractors fail to con-
tract around and indeed end up with fully compensatory damages. 
Moreover, as Bob Scott and others have seen, the Hadley rule is ma-
joritarian in the sense that a majority of contracting parties would 
prefer the rule that deters the strategic withholding of information 
by an unrepresentative minority.107 If we go far enough back behind 
the veil of ignorance, all information-forcing rules are majoritarian. 
From this perspective, the dichotomy between majoritarian and pen-
alty defaults is false. 
 But the Hadley rule example is still powerful because its effi-
ciency stems from its inducing some contractors to contract around 
the default, rather than from enabling parties to save on the costs of 
contracting around it. At the time Rob and I were writing, there was 
a consensus that defaults should be chosen to minimize the costs 
spent on contracting around them. But the efficiency of the Hadley 
default does not stem from that at all. Indeed, we showed that full 
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compensation might lead to no opt-out at all—low-cost shippers were 
deterred by sufficient contracting costs. 
 Others scholars at the time—including Easterbrook and Fischel—
argued that default rules should be set not at what the majority of 
contractors wanted, but at what the particular contractors would 
want if they were fully informed.108 This full-information hypothetical 
contract idea is also at sharp odds with the Hadley approach. In a 
full-information world, high-cost shippers would not contract for par-
tial compensation—so setting a default of partial compensation must 
be motivated by some other theory of default setting. 
 In retrospect, the Hadley example is not the cleanest example of a 
penalty default in part because it does not fit within the first guide-
post of inducing a majority of contractors to contract around the de-
fault. But I continue to believe that it was sufficient unto the day in 
showing that both the transaction cost minimization and full-
information hypothetical contracting approaches were insufficient. 
The Hadley example showed that the informational impact of con-
tracting around was an important consideration in choosing among 
competing defaults. 
III.   RESPONDING TO MASKIN’S CLAIM 
 It is more than a little scary to be told by Eric Maskin that your 
game-theoretic analysis is “flawed” and “logically in error.”109 In this 
Part, I rebut these claims. The original Hadley model is still an equi-
librium example of the potential efficiency of information-forcing 
rules. 
 Let me begin by openly admitting that Maskin is a much, much 
better game-theorist than I am. If this dispute is going to be adjudi-
cated on an ad hominem basis, I lose.110 He has also been unerringly 
kind and generous to me throughout my career. It pains me to cross 
swords with someone whom I have so long admired.  
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 But a lot is at stake here. If Maskin is right, lots and lots of people 
are wrong—including a bevy of law-and-economics scholars who un-
derstood the importance of information-forcing rules before I did 
(such as Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Scott and Steve Shavell),111 and an 
even larger bevy who have signed off on the theory afterwards (in-
cluding Eric Posner!).112 If Maskin is right, we might even start to 
question whether it is useful to have law and economics done outside 
of economics departments.  
 Before delving into the nitty-gritty details of the modeling to ex-
plain why his criticisms are unconvincing, let me step back and give 
a more intuitive explanation for why Maskin’s attack on penalty de-
faults must be misplaced. 
 A central idea that Rob and I were trying to get across is that the 
very act of contracting around can have informational effects. Courts, 
in establishing rules that parties can displace, should take into ac-
count informational effects because the process of displacing them 
can inform people both inside and outside the contract. Fundamen-
tally, we believe that different defaults can have different informa-
tional effects. Lawmakers should take these informational effects 
into account (along with a bunch of other stuff) in choosing among 
competing possible defaults.113 Another way to put the idea that “dif-
ferent defaults can have different informational effects” is to say that 
different defaults can give rise to different degrees of pooling and 
separation. The act of contracting out (or displacing the default) is 
the act of separating.  
 Rob and I showed (and I still believe) that different defaults can, 
at times, give rise to different types of contractual pooling and sepa-
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rating equilibria. In choosing among these equilibria, lawmakers 
should consider not just the transaction costs, as Maskin suggests, 
but the potential impact on efficiency of different informational ef-
fects. Our original analysis showed that the Hadley default might 
give rise to a more efficient separating equilibrium, while a full-
compensation default might give rise to a less efficient pooling equi-
librium.114 The real danger of Maskin’s analysis is that readers might 
mistakenly come away thinking that lawmakers do not need to con-
sider the informational impact of law. But notwithstanding Maskin’s 
arguments, it is still clearly the case that different defaults can have 
different informational effects and can give rise to different degrees 
of pooling and separating.  
 So, how is it that Maskin could be led to a different conclusion?115 
Well to begin, it is not clear that Maskin is really concluding that pen-
alty defaults can never be efficient.  He concedes that the nearly iden-
tical model of Bebchuk and Shavell is not in error.116 Like the Ayres-
Gertner model, the Bebchuk and Shavell model of Hadley gives rise to 
the possibility that a penalty default can be efficient if transaction 
costs keep disfavored contracting types (the low-value buyers) from 
contracting around a full-damages default. In accepting the Bebchuk 
and Shavell result, Maskin is accepting the idea that defaults can be 
preferable not because they economize on transaction costs but be-
cause they instead induce more efficient separating equilibria.  
 Maskin’s reason for distinguishing between the two mathemati-
cally identical models turns solely on the interpretation he attributes 
to the transaction cost variable in the two models. Maskin accepts 
the possible efficiency of penalty defaults when the transaction cost 
is a cost of communication between the parties (which he attributes 
to Bebchuk and Shavell), while he rejects the possible efficiency of 
penalty defaults when the transaction cost is the cost of contracting 
around the default (which he attributes to Ayres and Gertner). 
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 Maskin rejects the idea that costs of drafting an alternative dam-
age rule can support an inefficient pooling equilibrium under the 
full-damages default, because he claims the parties could achieve a 
separating equilibrium by signing a contract in which “the buyer is to 
divulge [its] value.”117 Maskin’s idea is that even though the parties 
would still pool on the full-damages contract term, the low-value and 
high-value buyers would divulge their values to the seller so that the 
seller could put forth the efficient effort for each buyer type. 
 This is a characteristically inventive alternative. But it is not par-
ticularly persuasive. First, the cost of writing the “buyer must divulge 
its value” term might very well just replace the cost of contracting 
around the full damage rule—and therefore support the efficiency of 
the Hadley default. Maskin might respond that a norm that buyers 
will divulge their value does not need to be inserted in the contract. 
But if disclosure is not promised, what is to assure that a buyer will 
actually disclose after contracting? Maskin asserts “the buyer would be 
perfectly happy to divulge the information, because, given full-
damages liability, she would continue to get her full benefit.”118 But 
Maskin’s argument masks that buyers are at best indifferent after 
contracting about whether they will voluntarily divulge their values. 
Moreover, one can imagine that low-value buyers will be tempted to 
say that they have a high value so as to induce higher effort on the 
part of sellers. Indeed, any possibility of undercompensation by the 
court would make misrepresentation a dominant strategy for low-
value buyers. Of course, Maskin might respond that misrepresentation 
could be punished if (the seller breaches and) the buyer is found to 
have breached her promise to divulge her accurate value. But this 
pushes Maskin back to the untentable argument that the parties must 
incur the costs of explicitly contracting for a divulging duty. 
 At the end of the day, Maskin’s contractual alternative is truly in-
genious, but it is hardly a serious challenge to the possibility that 
penalty defaults can be efficient. Indeed, even within the Hadley con-
text, his example either substitutes one type of contracting cost for 
another or is based on a fragile and unrealistic noncontractual di-
vulging norm. Still Maskin’s article is an interesting contribution to 
default theory for emphasizing the importance of being precise in ar-
ticulating the exact nature of transaction costs. Maskin is right that 
understanding the particular type of costs is important to analyzing 
the efficient default rule. But he is wrong in suggesting that this at-
tention to the precise type of costs undermines the possibility that 
penalty (or information-forcing) defaults will at times be efficient. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Notwithstanding the title, I have tried in this response to provide 
substantive arguments for why the central claims of the two Erics 
are mistaken. Eric Posner is mistaken that there are no penalty de-
faults because there are plenty of examples of legal rules that are the 
equivalent of default rules whose potential efficiency is best under-
stood by their informational impact of the separating equilibria that 
they induce. Eric Maskin is mistaken because his counterexample 
merely displaces one type of contracting cost with another. Even after 
taking into account his divulging promise alternative, there will re-
main intermediate transaction cost levels where the choice of default 
impacts the degree and efficiency of contractual separation.  
 It would be wrong for lawmakers to retreat to the bad old days 
where majoritarian default setting was seen as the only possibility. 
And while it has not been an emphasis of this Article, the new learn-
ing on behavioral economics radically expands the potential for al-
ternative choices. Attempts to de-bias or engage in asymmetric pa-
ternalism suggest a structuring of defaults, menus and altering rules 
that simply cannot be comprehended by the traditional majoritarian 
analysis.119  
 Different defaults have different information effects and induce 
different degrees of separation. At the end of the day, lawmakers 
should still take these differences into account when picking among 
competing defaults. 
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